NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement

Kyna Fong, Michael Schwarz

NBER Working Paper No. 14718
Issued in February 2009
NBER Program(s):Health Economics

This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14718

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