Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity
NBER Working Paper No. 14331
Issued in September 2008
NBER Program(s):The Corporate Finance Program, The Industrial Organization Program, The Law and Economics Program, The Labor Studies Program
We analyze the differences between companies owned by private equity (PE) investors and similar public companies. We document that PE-owned companies use much stronger incentives for their top executives and have substantially higher debt levels. However, we find little evidence that PE-owned firms outperform public firms in profitability or operational efficiency. We also show that the compensation and debt differences between PE-owned companies and public companies disappear over a very short period (one to two years) after the PE-owned firm goes public. Our results raise questions about whether and how PE firms and the incentives they put in place create value.
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Machine-readable bibliographic record -
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14331
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