TY  - JOUR
AU  - Lazear, Edward P
TI  - Incentives and Wage Rigidity
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 1299
PY  - 1984
Y2  - March 1984
DO  - 10.3386/w1299
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1299
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1299.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/723-9136
Fax: 650/723-0498
E-Mail: lazear@stanford.edu
AB  - With the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives. Some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries. it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity. Many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect: That is, they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall. This paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances.
ER  -