Individual Teacher Incentives And Student Performance
This paper is the first to systematically document the relationship between individual teacher performance incentives and student achievement using United States data. We combine data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey on schools, students, and their families with our own survey conducted in 2000 regarding the use of teacher incentives. This survey on teacher incentives has unique data on frequency and magnitude of merit raises and bonuses, teacher evaluation, and teacher termination. We find that test scores are higher in schools that offer individual financial incentives for good performance. Moreover, the estimated relationship between the presence of merit pay in teacher compensation and student test scores is strongest in schools that may have the least parental oversight. The association between teacher incentives and student performance could be due to better schools adopting teacher incentives or to teacher incentives eliciting more effort from teachers; it is impossible to rule out the former explanation with our cross sectional data.
We have benefitted from comments from John Krieg, Heather Rose and Hanna Skandera and seminar participants at the University of Florida and the American Education Finance Association. We appreciate the helpful comments from Jim Poterba and two anonymous reviewers. We are very grateful for Jin Jeon's help in coding the surveys and alerting us to various inconsistencies in the responses. We appreciate the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Warrington College of Business Administration. All errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figlio, David N. & Kenny, Lawrence W., 2007. "Individual teacher incentives and student performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 901-914, June. citation courtesy of