A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade
NBER Working Paper No. 1194
This paper develops a model in which the rivalry of oligopolistic firms serves as an independent cause of international trade. The model shows how such rivalry naturally gives rise to "dumping" of output in foreign markets, and shows that such dumping can be "reciprocal" -- that is, there may be two-way trade in the same product. Reciprocal dumpingis shown to be possible for fairly general specification of firm behaviour.The welfare effects of this seemingly pointless trade are ambiguous. On one hand, resources are wasted in the cross-handling of goods; on the other hand, increased competition reduces monopoly distortions. Surprisingly,in the case of free entry and Cournot behaviour reciprocal dumping is unanibiuously beneficial.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w1194
Published: Brander, James A. and Paul Krugman. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade." Journal of International Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3/4, (November 1983), pp. 313-321. citation courtesy of
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