Public Agricultural R&D and Brazilian Economic Development

11/01/2025
Summary of working paper 34213
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This figure is a bar chart with an accompanying map titled "Public R&D Investment in Brazilian Agriculture," showing the increase in agricultural total factor productivity in 2006 relative to holding public R&D fixed at pre-Embrapa levels. The y-axis of the bar chart shows percentage increase ranging from 0% to 160%. The x-axis contains two scenarios: "Observed" and "Counterfactual where only single research center exists." The map on the right shows the location of Embrapa research centers across Brazil with a legend indicating inauguration periods: 1973 to 1975 (blue circles), 1976 to 1985 (yellow squares), 1986 to 1995 (gray triangles), and From 1996 (red inverted triangles). The headquarters in Brasilia is marked separately. The figure demonstrates the substantial impact of distributed agricultural R&D investment. The observed productivity increase with multiple research centers is approximately 110%, while the counterfactual scenario with only a single research center shows a productivity increase of approximately 45%. The map shows research centers spread throughout Brazil, with early centers (1973-1975) concentrated in the central and southern regions, and later additions extending coverage nationwide. A note on the figure reads: Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Embrapa) is a public research corporation established in 1973 to develop locally suitable science and technology. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The source line reads: Researchers' calculations using Brazilian agriculture and geospatial data from multiple sources.

Global R&D investment is concentrated in a handful of high-income countries. When it is targeted to their specific needs, it may have limited productivity benefits elsewhere. In Public R&D Meets Economic Development: Embrapa and Brazil’s Agricultural Revolution (NBER Working Paper 34213), researchers Ariel AkermanJacob MosconaHeitor S. Pellegrina, and Karthik Sastry investigate whether public R&D in a developing country can overcome this problem of technology mismatch. They focus on Embrapa (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária), a large-scale agricultural research corporation that was launched in Brazil in 1973.

By investing in agricultural research about local ecological conditions, Brazil’s Embrapa more than doubled national agricultural productivity.

The researchers identify two ways in which Embrapa influences Brazilian agriculture. First, it alters the focus, trajectory, and productivity of agricultural science and technology development. Embrapa scientists are more likely than their peers to conduct research that is relevant to Brazil’s ecology and major staple crops. This was accomplished by building new research centers in all of Brazil’s diverse ecological zones, where researchers could focus on understanding local ecosystem characteristics, and was achieved while also increasing research productivity. Moreover, Embrapa also shifted the research focus for the broader Brazilian research community, inducing non-Embrapa researchers to tailor their focus to the local ecology.

Second, Embrapa substantially raised agricultural productivity in regions that were ecologically similar to Embrapa’s labs and hence positioned to benefit from its innovation. An increase in Embrapa exposure of 1 cross-sectional standard deviation leads to a 12 percent gain in agricultural productivity. This result is not driven by proximity to research centers but rather facilitated by the ecological relevance of technologies developed by Embrapa. There are outsize effects of Embrapa exposure on both the adoption of technology and the productivity of crops that Embrapa explicitly targets.

The researchers attribute a 110 percent increase in Brazilian agricultural productivity to Embrapa, with a benefit-cost ratio of 17. The corporation’s geographic scope plays an important role: The researchers estimate that if Embrapa operated out of one large headquarters, as opposed to multiple geographically dispersed stations, the gain would have been 47 rather than 110 percent.

— Laurel Britt