Banking on Inattention
We provide theory and evidence that depositor inattention creates bank market power. We develop a dynamic model of deposit pricing and franchise value in which inattention lowers deposit flow sensitivity. The policy rate is simultaneously banks’ marginal revenue, depositors’ outside option, and the discount rate on future profits. By raising the discount rate, rate hikes weaken banks’ incentives to retain deposits, generating incomplete pass-through that declines with inattention. Franchise value rises with the policy rate at low rates but falls at high rates. Using large-scale bank transaction data, we proxy for inattention by how much longer depositors keep unscheduled income in their accounts than scheduled income. Depositors with higher measured inattention withdraw less after rate hikes. Consistent with the model, banks with more inattentive depositors set lower rates, exhibit lower pass-through, and face less spread-sensitive outflows. Our calibration quantifies implications of depositor inattention for monetary pass-through and banking stability.
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Copy CitationXu Lu and Lingxuan Wu, "Banking on Inattention," NBER Working Paper 34783 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w34783.Download Citation
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