Control Without Ownership: Governance of Nonprofit Hospitals
Working Paper 34132
DOI 10.3386/w34132
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We analyze the governance of nonprofit hospitals, focusing on the external mechanism through the market for corporate control. Relative to for-profits, nonprofit boards are larger, have more employee directors, less industry expertise, and weaker incentives; CEO pay and turnover are less responsive to performance. Nonprofit takeovers are followed by insiders’ departures. However, nonprofits with poor financial performance are half as likely as for-profits to be acquired, and nonfinancial performance is unrelated to acquisitions. Oversight strength explains a substantial share of the takeover gap. While nonprofits may deliver stakeholder benefits, our evidence points to limits to governance as an associated cost.
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Copy CitationKatharina Lewellen, Gordon M. Phillips, and Giorgo Sertsios, "Control Without Ownership: Governance of Nonprofit Hospitals," NBER Working Paper 34132 (2025), https://doi.org/10.3386/w34132.Download Citation
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