NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Industry Input in Policymaking: Evidence from Medicare

David C. Chan, Jr, Michael J. Dickstein

NBER Working Paper No. 24354
Issued in February 2018
NBER Program(s):Health Care, Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, Public Economics, Political Economy

In setting prices for physician services, Medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry. We investigate whether this arrangement leads to prices biased toward the interests of committee members. We find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10%, demonstrating a pathway for regulatory capture. We then evaluate the effect of affiliation on the quality of information used in price-setting. More affiliated proposals produce less hard information, measured as lower quality survey data. However, affiliation results in prices that are more closely followed by private insurers, suggesting that affiliation may increase the total information used in price-setting.

download in pdf format
   (538 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w24354

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Sacks, Vu, Huang, and Karaca-Mandic w24129 How do insurance firms respond to financial risk sharing regulations? Evidence from the Affordable Care Act
Nicholson and Souleles w8536 Physician Income Expectations and Specialty Choice
Finan, Olken, and Pande w21825 The Personnel Economics of the State
Buchmueller, Jacobson, and Wold w10700 How Far to the Hospital? The Effect of Hospital Closures on Access to Care
Andreoni and Serra-Garcia w22824 Time-Inconsistent Charitable Giving
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us