NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Who Becomes a Politician?

Ernesto Dal Bó, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, Johanna Rickne

NBER Working Paper No. 23120
Issued in February 2017
NBER Program(s):Development Economics, Public Economics, Political Economy

Can a democracy attract competent leaders, while attaining broad representation? Economic models suggest that free-riding incentives and lower opportunity costs give the less competent a comparative advantage at entering political life. Moreover, if elites have more human capital, selecting on competence may lead to uneven representation. This paper examines patterns of political selection among the universe of municipal politicians and national legislators in Sweden, using extraordinarily rich data on competence traits and social background for the entire population. We document four new facts that together characterize an “inclusive meritocracy.” First, politicians are on average significantly smarter and better leaders than the population they represent. Second, this positive selection is present even when conditioning on family (and hence social) background, suggesting that individual competence is key for selection. Third, the representation of social background, whether measured by parental earnings or occupational social class, is remarkably even. Fourth, there is at best a weak tradeoff in selection between competence and social representation, mainly due to strong positive selection of politicians of low (parental) socioeconomic status. A broad implication of these facts is that it is possible for democracy to generate competent and socially-representative leadership.

download in pdf format
   (1692 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w23120

Published: Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Olle Folke & Torsten Persson & Johanna Rickne, 2017. "Who Becomes A Politician?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(4), pages 1877-1914. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Dal Bó, Hernández-Lagos, and Mazzuca w21829 The Paradox of Civilization: Pre-Institutional Sources of Security and Prosperity
Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Eyster w22916 The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects
Fisman, Shi, Wang, and Xu w23130 Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science
Finan and Mazzocco w21859 Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds
Allcott and Gentzkow w23089 Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us