NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Majority Choice of Tax Systems in Single- and Multi-Jurisdictional Economies

Stephen Calabrese, Dennis Epple, Richard Romano

NBER Working Paper No. 21231
Issued in June 2015
NBER Program(s):The Public Economics Program, The Political Economy Program

We examine majority choice of tax instruments in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies with heterogeneous households. In our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set. We identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments. Equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types. With multiple jurisdictions, strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating. Mobility fundamentally affects the equilibrium tax system with redistribution incentives dominating choice of instruments when mobility is limited. Limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification, public good provision levels, and tax systems.

download in pdf format
   (724 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w21231

Published: Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2015. "Majority choice of tax systems in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 58-70. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin w20780 A Variational Approach to the Analysis of Tax Systems
Calabrese, Epple, and Romano w17251 Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition
Galiani, Torre, and Torrens w21237 International Organizations and Structural Reforms
Fuchs-Sch√ľndeln and Hassan w21228 Natural Experiments in Macroeconomics
Lee and Lemieux w14723 Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us