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Tax Morale

Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Monica Singhal

NBER Working Paper No. 20458
Issued in September 2014
NBER Program(s):Development Economics, Public Economics

Standard economic models of tax compliance have focused on enforcement-driven compliance. Notably, tax administrators also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of improving "tax morale" by encouraging voluntary compliance, creating a culture of compliance, and changing social norms. Tax morale does indeed appear to be an important component of compliance decisions, and there is strong evidence that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying channels. There is less evidence - to date - that indicates we know how to leverage these channels to improve compliance and revenue collection in a consistently successful way.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w20458

Published: Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, 2014. "Tax Morale," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 149-68, Fall. citation courtesy of

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