The Distributional Preferences of Americans
We measure the distributional preferences of a large, diverse sample of Americans by embedding modified dictator games that vary the relative price of redistribution in the American Life Panel. Subjects' choices are generally consistent with maximizing a (social) utility function. We decompose distributional preferences into two distinct components - fair-mindedness (tradeoffs between oneself and others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs - by estimating constant elasticity of substitution utility functions at the individual level. Approximately equal numbers of Americans have equality-focused and efficiency-focused distributional preferences. After controlling for individual characteristics, our experimental measures of equality-efficiency tradeoffs predict the political decisions of our subjects.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w20145
Published: Raymond Fisman, Pamela Jakiela, Shachar Kariv, "Distributional preferences and political behavior" Journal of Public Economics, Volume 155, November 2017, Pages 1-10
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