The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection AgencyJoel Slemrod, Shlomo Yitzhaki
NBER Working Paper No. 1759 This paper addresses the optimal degree of law enforcement regarding tax evasion. It derives the conditions that characterize the optimal size of a tax collection agency, and then provides a simple interpretation of the conditions in terms of excess burden.The paper clarified earlier findings that suggest that the optimal size should be set higher than a simple cost-benefit calculation would indicate. It concludes with a numerical example that illustrates the optimality condition and demonstrates that a policy based on a naive cost-benefit analysis of the tax collection agency could result in a substantial overcommitment of resources.
Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w1759 Published: Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki. "The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.89, pp183-192, 1987W citation courtesy of Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
|

Contact Us