Pharmaceutical Stock Price Reactions to Price Constraint Threats and Firm-Level R&D Spending
Joseph Golec, Shantaram Hegde, John A. Vernon
NBER Working Paper No. 11229
Political pressure in the United States is again building to constrain pharmaceutical prices either directly or through legalized reimportation of lower-priced pharmaceuticals from foreign countries. This study uses the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural experiment to show how threats of price constraints affect firm-level R&D spending. We link events surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical company stock price changes and then examine the cross-sectional relation between the stock price changes and subsequent unexpected R&D spending changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on firm stock prices and R&D spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by $1.6 billion, even though it never became law. If the HSA had passed, and had many small firms not raised capital just prior to the HSA, the R&D effects could have been much larger.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11229
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