A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
Chapter in NBER book NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2011, Volume 26 (2012), Daron Acemoglu and Michael Woodford, editors (p. 195 - 230)
Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions' lobbying and mortgage-lending activities to answer this question. We find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking during 2000-2007 and with worse outcomes in 2008. In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization (1) originated mortgages with higher loan- to- income ratios, (2) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (3) had faster growing originations of mortgages. Moreover, delinquency rates in 2008 were higher in areas where lobbying lenders' mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during the rescue of Bear Stearns and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but positive abnormal returns when the bailout was announced. Finally, we find a higher bailout probability for lobbying lenders. These findings suggest that lending by politically active lenders played a role in accumulation of risks and thus contributed to the financial crisis.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1086/663992This chapter first appeared as NBER working paper w17076, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis, Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel
Commentary on this chapter:
Comment, Jeremy C. Stein
Comment, Luigi Zingales
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