Mass Layoffs and Unemployment
Working Paper 4766
DOI 10.3386/w4766
Issue Date
Mass layoffs give rise to groups of unemployed workers who possess similar characteristics and therefore may learn from one another's experience searching for a new job. Two factors lead them to be too selective in the job offers that they accept. The first is an information externality: searchers fail to take into account the value of their experience to others. The second is an incentive to free ride: each worker would like others to experiment and reveal information concerning productive jobs. Together these forces imply that in equilibrium the natural rate of unemployment is too high.
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Copy CitationAndrew Caplin and John Leahy, "Mass Layoffs and Unemployment," NBER Working Paper 4766 (1994), https://doi.org/10.3386/w4766.
Published Versions
Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy. "Mass Layoffs And Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economics, 2000, v46(1,Aug), 121-142. citation courtesy of