The Logic of State Surveillance

All states surveil political activists. How do they decide whom to watch and why? We study the logic of state surveillance using the first complete individual-level database of state targeting: 152,000 Italians born 1816-1932, across democratic and authoritarian regimes. Text analysis of police records shows that, among political opponents, the state singled out the educated – a visible signal of mobilization capacity. Exploiting a schooling reform that extended primary education discontinuously across population and cohort cutoffs, we find that two additional years of schooling increased surveillance by 64%, with effects concentrated among working classes, who were monitored longer and more intensively. Yet treated cohorts did not become more politically active, indicating that surveillance was preventive rather than reactive, rooted in fear of working-class empowerment. These findings reveal that states view educated but excluded groups as politically threatening and prioritize their surveillance, potentially generating inequalities in groups’ ability to influence political change.