NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion

Timothy Besley, Anders Jensen, Torsten Persson

NBER Working Paper No. 25575
Issued in February 2019
NBER Program(s):Public Economics, Political Economy

This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w25575

 
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