Bringing Real Market Participants' Real Preferences into the Lab: An Experiment that Changed the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
NBER Working Paper No. 22448
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The authors thank Gérard Cachon, without whom this study would never have been possible, and the Wharton School, in particular the Course Allocation Redesign Team and Wharton Computing. We thank Natalia Drozdoff, Adriaan Ten Kate and Xan Vongsathorn for excellent research assistance. We also thank Mohammad Akbarpour, Eduardo Azevedo, Peter Cramton, Stefano DellaVigna, Clayton Featherstone, Alex Frankel, Emir Kamenica, Scott Kominers, Robin Lee, Stephen Leider, John List, Paul Milgrom, Joshua Mollner, Muriel Niederle, Canice Prendergast, Jesse Shapiro, Alvin Roth and Glen Weyl, as well as seminar participants at Boston University, the Stony Brook Workshop on Experimental Game Theory, ESA Santa Cruz, University of Michigan, Stanford, Wharton, NBER Market Design, Chicago, AMMA 2015, MSR Designing the Digital Economy, Boston College, Princeton and the University of Virginia. Disclosure: the mechanism design in Budish (2011) and the computational procedure in Othman, Budish and Sandholm (2010) are in the public domain. Wharton funded the implementation of the A-CEEI mechanism at Wharton, creating intellectual property owned by Wharton. In 2017, Wharton spun out this intellectual property into a startup, Cognomos, of which Budish was made a director at its founding and has an equity stake. Wharton had no right of prior review of the present study. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.