Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining
Using a detailed dataset of hospitals' purchase orders, we find that information on purchasing by peer hospitals leads to reductions in the prices hospitals negotiate for supplies. Identification is based on staggered access to information across hospitals over time. Within coronary stents, reductions are concentrated among hospitals previously paying relatively high prices and for brands purchased in large volumes, and are consistent with resolving asymmetric information problems. Estimates across a large number of other important product categories indicate that the effects of information are largest in both absolute and relative terms for physician preference items (PPIs). Among PPIs, high-price, high-quantity hospital-brand combinations average 3.9 percent savings, versus 1.6 percent for commodities.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w22039
Published: Matthew Grennan & Ashley Swanson, 2020. "Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining," Journal of Political Economy, vol 128(4), pages 1234-1268.
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