The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency
This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa’s traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency’s revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, challenging the notion of state weakness.
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Copy CitationRaúl Sanchez de la Sierra, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang (Stan) Xie, Albert Malukisa Nkuku, and Aimable Amani Lameke, "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency," NBER Working Paper 30258 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3386/w30258.Download Citation
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Published Versions
Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra & Kristof Titeca & Haoyang (Stan) Xie & Aimable Amani Lameke & Albert Jolino Malukisa, 2024. "The Real State: Inside the Congo’s Traffic Police Agency," American Economic Review, vol 114(12), pages 3976-4014.