Faculty of Economics, and
Research Institute for Policy Evaluation and Desig
University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
126/1 Vibhavadee-Rangsit, Dindaeng
Institutional Affiliation: University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2016||A Market Based Solution for Fire Sales and Other Pecuniary Externalities|
with : w22056
We show how bundling, exclusivity and additional markets internalize fire sale and other pecuniary externalities. Ex ante competition can achieve a constrained efficient allocation. The solution can be put rather simply: create segregated market exchanges which specify prices in advance and price the right to trade in these markets so that participant types pay, or are compensated, consistent with the market exchange they choose and that type's excess demand contribution to the price in that exchange. We do not need to identify and quantify some policy intervention. With the appropriate ex ante design we can let markets solve the problem.
|July 2014||A Market Based Solution to Price Externalities: A Generalized Framework|
with : w20275
Pecuniary externalities have regained the interest of researchers as they seek policy interventions and regulations to remedy externality-induced distortions, e.g., balance sheet effects, amplifiers and fire sales. In this paper we go back to first principles and show how to design financial contracts and markets in such a way that ex ante competition can achieve a constrained-efficient allocation. The key as in general equilibrium theory is to extend the commodity space in such a way that bundling, exclusivity and additional markets internalize these pecuniary externalities. We devise in this paper a general way of proceeding that covers as a general case the large variety of example-economies which differ from one another in the particular source of the constraint generating the external...
|May 2014||Segregated Security Exchanges with Ex Ante Rights to Trade: A Market-Based Solution to Collateral-Constrained Externalities|
with : w20086
This paper studies a competitive general equilibrium model with default and endogenous collateralized contracts. The possibility of trade in spot markets creates externalities, as spot prices and the bindingness of collateral constraints interact. We propose a market based solution which overcomes the externalities problem and obviates the needs for any government policy intervention. If agents are allowed to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the state-contingent spot prices used to unwind collateral, over and above contracting on true underlying states of the world, then standard existence and welfare theorems apply, that is, competitive equilibria are equivalent with Pareto optima.