NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Vincent Anesi

University of Nottingham
Room B48 Sir Clive Granger Building
University Park
Nottingham NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

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Institutional Affiliation: University of Nottingham

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2018Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules
with Renee Bowen: w25033
We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than constraints on redistribution.
 
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