NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Kelly Bedard

Department of Economics
2127 North Hall
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: University of California at Santa Barbara

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2018Unequal Use of Social Insurance Benefits: The Role of Employers
with Sarah Bana, Maya Rossin-Slater, Jenna Stearns: w25163
California's Disability Insurance (DI) and Paid Family Leave (PFL) programs have become important sources of social insurance, with benefit payments now exceeding those of the state's Unemployment Insurance program. However, there is considerable inequality in program take-up. While existing research shows that firm-specific factors explain a significant part of the growing earnings inequality in the U.S., little is known about the role of firms in determining the use of public leave-taking benefits. Using administrative data from California, we find strong evidence that DI and PFL program take-up is substantially higher in firms with high earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase in the firm premium is associated with a 57 percent higher claim rate incidence. Our results sugges...
March 2018The Impacts of Paid Family Leave Benefits: Regression Kink Evidence from California Administrative Data
with Sarah Bana, Maya Rossin-Slater: w24438
We use ten years of California administrative data with a regression kink design to estimate the causal impacts of benefits in the first state-level paid family leave program for women with earnings near the maximum benefit threshold. We find no evidence that a higher weekly benefit amount (WBA) increases leave duration or leads to adverse future labor market outcomes for this group. In contrast, we document that a rise in the WBA leads to an increased likelihood of returning to the pre-leave firm (conditional on any employment) and of making a subsequent paid family leave claim.
November 2013Making Nutritional Information Digestible: Effects of a Receipt-Based Intervention on Restaurant Purchases
with Peter J. Kuhn: w19654
We study the effects of receipts that include personalized ordering suggestions designed to reduce fat and calorie consumption on purchasing behavior at a restaurant chain. We find that customers, in the aggregate, made most of the item substitutions that were encouraged by the messages, such as substituting ham for sausage in a breakfast sandwich, or substituting frozen yogurt for ice cream, though effects on overall calories and fat consumed were small. The results illustrate the potential of emerging information technologies, which allow retailers to tailor product marketing to individual consumers, to contribute in meaningful new ways to the battle against obesity.

Published: Journal of Health Economics Volume 39, January 2015, Pages 106–122 Cover image Micro-marketing healthier choices: Effects of personalized ordering suggestions on restaurant purchases ☆ Kelly Bedard1, , Peter Kuhn,

January 2011Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives
with Philip Babcock, Gary Charness, John Hartman, Heather Royer: w16687
This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In two field experiments featuring exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels. The team compensation system induced agents to choose effort as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensation for their teammate from two-thirds as much (in one study) to twice as much as they valued a dollar of their own compensation (in the other study). We conclude that social effects of monetary team incentives exist and can induce effort at lower cost than through direct individual payment.
 
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