Jean-Etienne de Bettignies
Smith School of Business
143 Union Street
Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6
Institutional Affiliation: Queen's University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|October 2018||The Effects of Downstream Competition on Upstream Innovation and Licensing|
with , , : w25166
We study how competition between two downstream firms affects an upstream innovator's innovation strategy, which includes selecting how much innovation to produce and whether to license this innovation to one (targeted licensing) or both (market-wide licensing) downstream competitors. Our model points to a U-shaped relationship between downstream competition and upstream innovation: at low levels of competition, market-wide licensing is optimal and competition reduces innovation, while at high levels of competition targeted licensing is optimal and competition increases innovation. Empirical analysis using a large panel of US data provides clear support for these predictions linking competition, innovation and licensing.
|July 2015||When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable?|
with : w21364
We study a model in which corporate social responsibility (CSR) arises as a response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms generate profits but create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may or may not be socially optimal. Governments may choose suboptimal levels of regulation if they face lobbying pressure from companies. Companies can, in turn, hire socially responsible employees who enjoy taking actions to ameliorate the negative spillovers. Because firms can capture part of the rent created by allowing socially responsible employees to correct social ills, in some settings they find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then capture the surplus associated with ...
Published: When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable? Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and David T. Robinson Journal of Labor Economics 0 0:ja