Henry S. Schneider
Stephen J.R. Smith School of Business
Kingston, ON K7L 3N6
Institutional Affiliation: Queen’s University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2016||Forgetting and Heterogeneity in Task Delay: Evidence from New York City Parking-Ticket Recipients|
with Ori Heffetz, Ted O'Donoghue: w23012
We study response behavior of New York City parking-ticket recipients by analyzing administrative data on 6.6 million tickets issued to 2 million individuals over two years. Exploiting variation (from a policy change and a field experiment) in letters sent to recipients, we find that forgetting plays a major role in delay–letters seem to act mostly as reminders, with their content mattering little. Moreover, by studying an individual’s behavior across multiple tickets, we find significant heterogeneity in underlying types, with different types reacting differently to deadlines and reminders. Failure to account for this heterogeneity yields biased–and sometimes incorrect–conclusions.
|November 2013||Reducing Moral Hazard in Employment Relationships: Experimental Evidence on Managerial Control and Performance Pay|
with C. Kirabo Jackson: w19645
Moral hazard is endemic to employment relationships and firms often use performance pay and managerial control to address this problem. While performance pay has received much empirical attention, managerial control has not. We analyze data from a managerial-control field experiment in which an auto-repair firm provided detailed checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher under the experiment. We compare this effect to that of quasi-experimental increases in mechanic commission rates. The managerial-control effect is equivalent to that of a 10 percent commission increase. We find evidence of complementarities between the two, suggesting benefits from an all-of-the-above approach. We also find evidence of incentive gaming under performance pay.
|August 2010||Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry|
with C. Kirabo Jackson: w16279
This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of economic agents in settings with incomplete contracts. We study the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers as a result of a moral hazard associated with incomplete leasing contracts. Using instrumental variables and fixed-effects analyses, we find that: (1) drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard; (2) network effects appear to operate primarily via social sanctions; and (3) network benefits can help to explain the organization of the industry in terms of which drivers and owners form business relationships.
Published: Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Henry S. Schneider. 2011. “Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from New York City Taxi Industry.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 3 (July): 244267 citation courtesy of