NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Guillaume Fréchette

New York University
Department of Economics
19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012

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Institutional Affiliation: New York University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2019Rules and Commitment in Communication: an Experimental Analysis
with Alessandro Lizzeri, Jacopo Perego: w26404
We investigate models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion, in a unified experimental framework. Our umbrella design permits the analysis of models that share the same structure regarding preferences and information, but differ in two dimensions: the rules governing communication, which determine whether information is verifiable; and the sender’s commitment power, which determines the extent to which she can commit to her communication strategy. Commitment is predicted to have contrasting effects on information transmission, depending on whether information is verifiable. Our design exploits these variations to explicitly test for the role of rules and commitment in communication. Our experiments provide general support for the strategic rationale behind the role...
August 2018Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis
with Alessandro Lizzeri, Tobias Salz: w24921
This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions created by the need for both market sides to physically search for trading partners, and second, regulatory limitations to entry. To assess the importance of these features, we use the model to simulate the effect of changes in entry, alternative matching technologies, and different market density. We use the geographical features of the matching process to back out unobserved demand through a matching simulation. This function exhibits increasing returns to scale, which is important to understand the impact of changes in this market a...

Published: Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Tobias Salz, 2019. "Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis," American Economic Review, vol 109(8), pages 2954-2992. citation courtesy of

 
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