Department of Economics
Williamstown, MA 01267
Institutional Affiliation: Williams College
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2013||Bank Regulation and Supervision in 180 Countries from 1999 to 2011|
with James R. Barth, Ross Levine: w18733
In this paper and the associated online database, we provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011. The data include and the measures are based upon responses to hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning. The dataset also provides information on the organization of regulatory agencies and the size, structure, and performance of banking systems. Since the underlying surveys are large and complex, we construct summary indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies to facilitate cross-country co...
Published: James R. Barth & Gerard Caprio Jr & Ross Levine, 2013. "Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 111-219, April. citation courtesy of
|December 2003||Governance and Bank Valuation|
with Luc Laeven, Ross Levine: w10158
Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority sharehol...
Published: Caprio, Gerard & Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross, 2007. "Governance and bank valuation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 584-617, October. citation courtesy of
|January 2001||Banking Systems around the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?|
with James R. Barth, Ross Levine
in Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, Frederic S. Mishkin, editor