University of Oldenburg
Department of Economics
Institutional Affiliation: University of Oldenburg
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2011||Embodied Carbon Tariffs|
with Jared C. Carbone, Thomas F. Rutherford: w17376
In a world where the prospects of a global agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions are bleak, the idea of using trade policy as an implicit regulation of foreign emission sources has gained many supporters in countries contemplating unilateral climate policies. Embodied carbon tariffs tax the direct and indirect carbon emissions embodied in imported goods. The appeal seems obvious: as OECD countries are, on average, large net importers of embodied emissions from non-OECD countries, carbon tariffs could substantially extend the reach of OECD climate policies. We investigate this claim by simulating the effects of embodied carbon tariffs with a computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use. We find that embodied carbon tariffs do effectively reduce carbon leakage....
Published: Christoph Böhringer & Jared Carbone & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2016. "Embodied Carbon Tariffs," The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, . citation courtesy of
|April 2010||Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives|
with Andreas Lange, Thomas F. Rutherford: w15899
Carbon control policies in OECD countries commonly differentiate emission prices in favor of energy-intensive industries. While leakage provides a efficiency argument for differential emission pricing, the latter may be a disguised beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade. Using an optimal tax framework, we propose a method to decompose the leakage motive and the terms-of-trade motive for emission price differentiation. We illustrate our method with a quantitative impact assessment of unilateral climate policies for the U.S. and EU economies. We conclude in these instances that complex optimal emission price differentiation does not substantially reduce the overall economic costs of carbon abatement compared with a simple rule of uniform emission pricing.
Published: BÃ¶hringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2014. "Optimal emission pricing in the presence of international spillovers: Decomposing leakage and terms-of-trade motives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 101-111. citation courtesy of