Adriano A. Rampini
Fuqua School of Business
100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Institutional Affiliation: Duke University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2019||Risk Management in Financial Institutions|
with S. Viswanathan, Guillaume Vuillemey: w25698
We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, both across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to drops in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.
Published: ADRIANO A. RAMPINI & S. VISWANATHAN & GUILLAUME VUILLEMEY, 2020. "Risk Management in Financial Institutions," The Journal of Finance, vol 75(2), pages 591-637.
|March 2017||Financial Intermediary Capital|
with S. Viswanathan: w23302
We propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households, that is, have a collateralization advantage. Intermediaries require capital as they can borrow against their loans only to the extent that households themselves can collateralize the assets backing these loans. The net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity, such as investment, and financing. The accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector. The model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch, namely, their severity, their...
Published: Adriano A Rampini & S Viswanathan, 2019. "Financial Intermediary Capital," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 86(1), pages 413-455. citation courtesy of
|June 2016||Financing Durable Assets|
This paper studies the effect of durability on the financing of durable assets. We show that more durable assets require larger down payments of internal funds per unit of capital making them harder to finance, because durability affects the price of an asset and hence the overall financing need more than its collateral value. This insight has implications for the choice between new and used capital, technology adoption, and the rent versus buy decision. Constrained borrowers purchase used assets which are less durable than new assets and adopt less durable, low quality assets, that are otherwise dominated technologies. More durable assets are more likely to be rented given their larger financing need. Legal enforcement affects trade and technology adoption; weak legal enforcement economie...
Published: Adriano A. Rampini, 2019. "Financing Durable Assets," American Economic Review, vol 109(2), pages 664-701. citation courtesy of
|May 2016||Household Risk Management|
with S. Viswanathan: w22293
Households' insurance against shocks to income and asset values (that is, household risk management) is limited, especially for poor households. We argue that a trade-off between intertemporal financing needs and insurance across states explains this basic insurance pattern. In a model with limited enforcement, we show that household risk management is increasing in household net worth and income, incomplete, and precautionary. These results hold in economies with income risk, durable goods and collateral constraints, and durable goods price risk, under quite general conditions and, remarkably, risk aversion is sufficient and prudence is not required. In equilibrium, collateral scarcity lowers the interest rate, reduces insurance, and increases inequality.