Training Your Replacement: Worker Incentives and the Pace of Automation
Working Paper 35950
DOI 10.3386/w35950
Issue Date
Firms ask workers to train AI systems that will replace them. We model this with a worker who can shirk, cooperate with training, or obstruct training while maintaining productivity. Because training ends the job but only cooperation completes training, dismissal becomes a weaker penalty for shirking. The firm must raise the worker’s rent, and the worker gains from their replacement. AI can create jobs paying more than they produce and eliminate jobs it never automates. Firms paying only wages may slow training. A credible completion bonus equal to the worker’s rent without AI removes both the gain and the slowdown.
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Copy CitationJoshua S. Gans and Peter Landry, "Training Your Replacement: Worker Incentives and the Pace of Automation," NBER Working Paper 35950 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w35950.Download Citation