The Federal Lands: An Economic Property Rights Perspective

The US federal government owns and administers 472,892,659 acres or 21% of the land area of the lower 48 states, the country’s largest landowner. The resource is held and managed as a collective resource, the Federal Lands, through political and bureaucratic interpretation of the Multiple Use principle and generally, the biological aim of maximum sustained-yield. By contrast, access, exchange, and investment for most other US natural resources are through private property rights and markets. Despite the magnitude of the resource, economists have devoted relatively limited attention to the economic and welfare impact. The objective is to suggest economic implications and to encourage additional economic analyses. The discussion summarizes federal lands privatization through 1891, when withholding of federal lands began. The literature reveals no demonstratable market failure or increased resource scarcity from private exploitation between 1870 and 1957 when most lands were withheld. Because land was nonmobile and observable private property rights could have been assigned and any externalities addressed via Pigouvian restrictions or Coasean exchange. Federal ownership was not obviously required. Progressive Era reformers, driven by concerns of impending resource depletion, called for scientific, sustained-yield management by government officials. The institutional change is economically important. As outlined by Dixit and others, private rights holders have high powered incentives for efficient resource use that are lacking in decision making by agency officials who do not hold exchangeable property rights and do not directly bear the economic costs and benefits of their actions. Consequential public goods delivery could be an offset, but these are not measured for tradeoff calculations. Following Krueger, a rent-seeking framework is presented for comparing outcomes with economic property rights and political management. The analysis suggests that a.) federal lands will have lower production value than comparable private, all else equal; (b). federal lands management will be less responsive to shifts in economic costs and benefits. Public goods may be provided for high amenity, recreation, and ecological areas, but the dominant Multiple Use management principle provides no objective criteria for allocation or for periodic outcome assessment and adjustment. A literature review and data for contemporary federal forests, range, and oil and gas lands are provided.