A Theory of International Official Lending
Official lending is large, senior, and countercyclical, continuing after sovereigns fall into arrears on private debt. We ask why sovereign finance exhibits this division of labor across creditors. In a production economy where a risk-averse sovereign privately allocates imported inputs, commitment is limited on both sides, and monitoring generates a noisy signal, the constrained-optimal allocation is decentralized by defaultable private debt, senior non-defaultable multilateral debt, and concessional bilateral debt whose relief is tied to the signal. Production remains distorted, but the sovereign is never excluded: official lending is monitored liquidity provision. A calibration reproduces procyclical private and countercyclical official debt.
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Copy CitationQing Liu, Zanhui Liu, and Vivian Zhanwei Yue, "A Theory of International Official Lending," NBER Working Paper 35667 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w35667.Download Citation