Who is Afraid of Eurobonds?
Working Paper 35510
DOI 10.3386/w35510
Issue Date
The current euro area policy framework conflates short-run stabilization with long-run fiscal sustainability, exposing members to deflationary and inflationary tail risks. We employ an estimated euro area model to analyze an alternative framework that separates these objectives. A centralized Treasury issues Eurobonds to finance countercyclical stabilization, while national governments retain responsibility for long-term fiscal sustainability. The Treasury can coordinate with the monetary authority in case of a large recession, with no need to suspend fiscal rules at the national level. The arrangement functions as an automatic stabilizer, eliminating the tail risks of deflation and fiscal stagflation.
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Copy CitationFrancesco Bianchi, Qingyuan Fang, Leonardo Melosi, and Anna Rogantini Picco, "Who is Afraid of Eurobonds?," NBER Working Paper 35510 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w35510.Download Citation