All the President's Friends: Political Access and Firm Value
Using novel data on White House visitors from 2009 through 2015, we find that corporate executives’ meetings with key policymakers are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. We also find evidence suggesting that following meetings with federal government officials, firms receive more government contracts and are more likely to receive regulatory relief (as measured by the tone of regulatory news). The investment of these firms also becomes less affected by political uncertainty after the meetings. Using the 2016 presidential election as a shock to political access, we find that firms with access to the Obama administration experience significantly lower stock returns following the release of the election result than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting that political access is of significant value to corporations.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w23356
Published: Jeffrey R. Brown & Jiekun Huang, 2020. "All the President's Friends: Political Access and Firm Value," Journal of Financial Economics, .
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