NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness

Michael Carlos Best, Jonas Hjort, David Szakonyi

NBER Working Paper No. 23350
Issued in April 2017, Revised in October 2019
NBER Program(s):Development Economics Program, Public Economics Program, Political Economy Program, Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship Program

How important are bureaucrats for the productivity of the state? And to what extent do the tradeoffs between different policies depend on the implementing bureaucrats’ effectiveness? Using data on 16million public procurement purchases in Russia during 2011–2016, we show that over 40 percent of the variation in quality-adjusted prices paid—our measure of performance—is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations that manage procurement processes. Such differences in effectiveness matter for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common procurement policy— bid preferences for domestic suppliers—dramatically improves performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats.

download in pdf format
   (1620 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w23350

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Decarolis, Giuffrida, Iossa, Mollisi, and Spagnolo w24201 Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Sorenson w23431 Innovation Policy in a Networked World
Novokmet, Piketty, and Zucman w23712 From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia, 1905-2016
Finan, Olken, and Pande w21825 The Personnel Economics of the State
Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain, and Khan w22340 The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us