TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mulligan, Casey B
AU  - Shleifer, Andrei
TI  - Population and Regulation
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10234
PY  - 2004
Y2  - January 2004
DO  - 10.3386/w10234
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10234
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10234.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Casey B. Mulligan
University of Chicago
Department of Economics
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/702-9017
Fax: 773/702-8490
E-Mail: c-mulligan@uchicago.edu

Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu
AB  - We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967). In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history. We also find that specific types of regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations. Overall, the data show that population is an empirically important determinant of regulation.
ER  -