The World Bank
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Institutional Affiliation: The World Bank
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2015||Rigidity of Public Contracts|
with Marian Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller: w21186
We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with relational private contracts. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based rigid clauses; in addition, their renegotiation is formalized in amendments. We also find that contract length and the frequency of rigidity clauses increases in political contestability and closer to upcoming elections. We maintain that the higher rigidity of public contracts is a political risk adaptation strategy carried out by public agents attempting to lower third-party opportunistic challenges.
Published: Marian Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz, 2016. "Rigidity of Public Contracts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, vol 13(3), pages 396-427.