Raymond G. Riezman
Department of Economics
Henry B. Tippie College of Business
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
Institutional Affiliation: University of Iowa
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2009||International Trade and the Negotiability of Global Climate Change Agreements|
with Yuezhou Cai, John Whalley: w14711
Country incentives to participate in cooperative arrangements which either fully or partially internalize climate change externalities from carbon emissions involve critical asymmetries. Small countries trade off own country costs of carbon mitigation actions against their own benefits from global improvements in climate which benefit all. Small countries thus have limited incentive to participate as their actions, while costly to them, have a significant impact on global temperature change which mainly benefits others. Here we build on the work of Shapley and Shubik (1969) which suggests that the core of a global warming game without transferable utility may be empty and use numerical simulation methods to analyse country incentives to participate in carbon emission limitation negotiation...
Published: Economic Modelling Volume 33, July 2013, Pages 421–427 Cover image International trade and the negotiability of global climate change agreements ☆ Yuezhou Caia, Raymond Riezmanb, c, John Whalleyd, e citation courtesy of
|October 2005||Minorities and Storable Votes|
with Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey: w11674
The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desidered over a series of binary decisions. By cumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only of its strength of preferences is high and the majority's strength of preferences is low. The result is that aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.
Published: Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Riezman, Raymond, 2008. "Minorities and Storable Votes," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(2), pages 165-200, July. citation courtesy of
|May 2001||How Often Are Propositions on the Effects of Customs Unions Theoretical Curiosa and When Should They Guide Policy?|
with Lisandro Abrego, John Whalley: w8304
This paper uses computational techniques to assess whether or not various propositions that have been advanced as plausible in the literature on Customs Unions (or other regional trade agreements) may actually hold. The idea is to make probabilistic statements as to whether propositions of interest might hold, rather than to restrict assumptions so they unambiguously hold. Our aim is to blend theory and numerical simulation and go beyond the ambiguous analytically derived propositions that dominate the theoretical literature so as to assess the likelihood of propositions holding for particular model specifications.
Published: Abrego, Lisandro, Raymond Riezman and John Whalley. "How Often Are Propositions On The Effects Of Regional Trade Agreements Theoretical Curiosa?," Journal of International Economics, 2006, v68(1,Jan), 59-78.
|March 2001||How Reasonable Are Assumptions Used in Theoretical Models?: Computational Evidence on the Likelihood of Trade Pattern Changes|
with Lisandro Abrego, John Whalley: w8169
This paper seeks to contribute to discussion of the reasonableness of sometimes seemingly innocent assumptions used in theoretical trade models that the direction of trade is both predetermined for each good for each country and fixed. Here, we provide computational evidence as to the reasonableness of this assumption. We consider a simple three-country, three-good, pure-exchange model with CES preferences. We compute free trade competitive equilibria, three-country non-cooperative Nash equilibria, and customs union equilibria for randomized parameterizations, and find that trade patterns change in around 35% of the cases between free trade and customs union equilibria. In three-country Nash and customs unions comparisons trade patterns change roughly 40% of the time. We evaluate alter...
Published: Abrego, Lisandro, Raymond Riezman and John Whalley. “How Reasonable are Assumptions Used in Theoretical Models? Computational Evidence on the Likelihood of Trade Pattern Changes." Canadian Journal of Economics 39, 3 (August 2006): 781-789.