Bush School of Government
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77840-4220
Institutional Affiliation: Texas A&M University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2009||What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade|
with Pravin Krishna, Marcelo Olarreaga: w14953
Policy making power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated. This paper investigates quantitatively the welfare mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countries.
Published: Gawande, Kishore & Krishna, Pravin & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2009.
"What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade,"
Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(03), pages 491-532, July.
citation courtesy of
|May 2005||Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy|
with Pravin Krishna, Marcelo Olarreaga: w11371
Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well-known Grossman-Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified suitably to account for the cross-sectoral use of inputs in production (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis. Our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition. Importantly, accounting fo...
Published: By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, 02. citation courtesy of
|January 2004||Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy|
with Pravin Krishna, Michael J. Robbins: w10205
In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this pap...
Published: Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna and Michael J. Robbins. "Foreign Lobbies And U.S. Trade Policy," Review of Economics and Statistics, 2006, v88(3,Aug), 563-571. citation courtesy of