Kent State University
Department of Economics
Kent, OH 44242-0001
Institutional Affiliation: Kent State University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2008||Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The Role of Contracts|
with Jerry Thursby, Marie C. Thursby: w14226
We examine commonly observed forms of payment, such as milestones, royalties, or consulting contracts as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions. Our theoretical model shows that when milestones are feasible, royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is risk averse. The model also predicts the use of consulting contracts which improve the firm's ability to monitor inventor effort. Because these contracts increase the firm's expected profits, the upfront fee that the university can charge is higher than otherwise. These results therefore support the commonly observed university policy of allowing faculty to consult with licensing firms outside of their university contracts. They also support firm policies of including milestones. An empirical analysis ...
Published: Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Thursby, Jerry & Thursby, Marie, 2011. "Inventor moral hazard in university licensing: The role of contracts," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 94-104, February. citation courtesy of
|February 2005||Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts|
with Marie Thursby, Jerry Thursby: w11128
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists. Our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard, risk sharing, and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed. Milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties. The potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional, but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it. Whether the licensing contract prevents shelving de...
Published: Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Thursby, Marie & Thursby, Jerry, 2009. "Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of university license contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 80-91, January. citation courtesy of
|May 2003||Appropriability and the timing of innovation: Evidence from MIT inventions|
with Brent Goldfarb, Scott A. Shane, Marie C. Thursby: w9735
At least since Arrow (1962), the effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied, but there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions. Exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions licensed from MIT between 1980 and 1996, we explore the influence of several appropriability mechanisms on the commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on university inventions. Our central hypothesis is that the relationship between a licensee's decision to either terminate or commercialize the invention is driven by the current market value of the invention, as well as the option value of delaying its commercialization. We use a competing risks framework that allows...