Department of Economics
University of Virginia
Monroe Hall, Suite 222
Charlottesville, VA 22903
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Institutional Affiliation: University of Virginia
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2020||Leverage and Asset Prices: An Experiment.|
with Marco Cipriani, Daniel Houser: w26701
We develop a model of leverage that is amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. We compare two identical economies: in one economy, agents cannot borrow; in the other, they can leverage a risky asset to issue debt. Leverage increases asset prices in the laboratory. This increase is significant and quantitatively close to what theory predicts. Moreover, also as theory suggests, leverage allows gains from trade to be realized in the laboratory. Finally, the mechanism generating the price increase in the lab is due to the asset role as collateral, and different from what we would observe with a simple credit line or bigger cash endowments.
|November 2019||Endogenous Leverage and Default in the Laboratory|
with Marco Cipriani, Daniel Houser: w26469
We study default and endogenous leverage in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model of collateralized borrowing amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the model, leverage is endogenous: agents choose how much to borrow using a risky asset as collateral, and there are no ad-hoc collateral constraints. When the risky asset is financial, namely, its payoff does not depend on ownership (such as a bonds), collateral requirements are high and there is no default. In contrast, when the risky asset is non-financial, namely, its payoff depends on ownership (such as a firm), collateral requirements are lower and default occurs. The experimental outcomes are in line with the theory's main predictions. The type of collateral, whether fina...
|February 2019||Global Collateral and Capital Flows|
with John Geanakoplos, Gregory Phelan: w25583
Cross-border financial flows arise when (otherwise identical) countries differ in their abilities to use assets as collateral to back financial contracts. Financially integrated countries have access to the same set of financial instruments, and yet there is no price convergence of assets with identical payoffs, due to a gap in collateral values. Home (financially advanced) runs a current account deficit. Financial flows amplify asset price volatility in both countries, and gross flows driven by collateral differences collapse following bad news about fundamentals. Our results can explain financial flows among rich, similarly-developed countries, and why these flows increase volatility.
|June 2007||Latin America's Access to International Capital Markets: Good Behavior or Global Liquidity?|
with Graciela Laura Kaminsky: w13194
This paper examines Latin America's access to international capital markets from 1980 to 2005, with particular attention to the role of domestic and external factors. To capture access to international markets, we use primary gross issuance in international bond, equity, and syndicated-loan markets. Using panel estimation, we find that sound fundamentals matter. For example, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile's superb performance in capital markets during the early 1990s has been in large part driven by better fundamentals. However, the upsurge in international lending to Latin America starting in 2003 has been mainly driven by a dramatic increase in global liquidity.
Published: Ana Fostel & Graciela Laura Kaminsky, 2008.
"Latin America´s Access to International Capital Markets: Good Behavior or Global Liquidity?,"
Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,
in: Kevin Cowan & Sebastián Edwards & Rodrigo O. Valdés & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmid (ed.), Current Account and External Financing, edition 1, volume 12, chapter 4, pages 117-158
Central Bank of Chile.