National University of Singapore Business School
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Institutional Affiliation: National University of Singapore
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2019||Bank of Japan Equity Purchases: The Final Frontier in Extreme Quantitative Easing|
with Ben Charoenwong, Randall Morck: w25525
Between 2011 and March 2018, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) purchased equity worth approximately 4% of Japan’s GDP. We find the stock return elasticity with respect to BOJ purchases is around 1.6 on the day of the purchase. Over one quarter, purchases worth 1% of total assets correspond to a one-percentage-point increase in returns and a 0.27-percentage-point increase in total assets. BOJ purchases also predict equity but not debt issuances. However, the increases in total assets largely reflect increased cash and short-term investments. This unconventional monetary stimulus thus does not appear to transmit into tangible capital investment.
|March 2011||Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms|
with Vikas Mehrotra, Randall Morck, Jungwook Shim: w16874
The practice of adopting adults, even if one has biological children, makes Japanese family firms unusually competitive. Our nearly population-wide panel of postwar listed nonfinancial firms shows inherited family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well - an unusual finding for a developed economy. Adopted heirs' firms outperform blood heirs' firms, and match or nearly match founder-run listed firms. Both adopted and blood heirs' firms outperform non-family firms. Using family structure variables as instruments, we find adopted heirs "causing" elevated performance. These findings are consistent with adult adoptees displacing blood heirs in the left tail of the talent distribution, with the "adopted son" job motivating star managers, and with ...
Published: Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall & Shim, Jungwook & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2013. "Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 840-854. citation courtesy of
|September 2010||Must Love Kill the Family Firm?|
with Vikas Mehrotra, Randall Morck, Jungwook Shim: w16340
Family firms depend on a succession of capable heirs to stay afloat. If talent and IQ are inherited, this problem is mitigated. If, however, progeny talent and IQ display mean reversion (or worse), family firms are eventually doomed. This is the essence of the critique of family firms in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003). Since family firms persist, solutions to this succession problem must exist. We submit that marriage can transfuse outside talent and reinvigorate family firms. This implies that changes to the institution of marriage - notably, a decline in arranged marriages in favor of marriages for "love" - bode ill for the survival of family firms. Consistent with this, the predominance of family firms correlates strongly across countries with plausible proxies for arranged...
Published: Mehrotra, Vikas, Randall Morck, Jungwook Shim & Yupana Wiwattanakantang. 2010. Must Love Kill the Family Firm? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 36(6)1121-48.