Salvatore Nunnari

Bocconi University
Via Roentgen 1, Office 5-C2-05
20136 Milano, Italy

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Bocconi University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

November 2016Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations
with David P. Baron, Renee Bowen: w22821
We present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions – coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next. We study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote. We compare committees with no communication, committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members, and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send private messages to any other committee member. We find that the opportunity to communicate has a signif...

Published: David P. Baron & Renee Bowen & Salvatore Nunnari, 2017. "Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, . citation courtesy of

July 2016The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study
with Marco Battaglini, Thomas R. Palfrey: w22406
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political distortions in the accumulation of public debt. A legislature bargains over the levels of a public good and of district specific transfers in two periods. The legislature can issue or purchase risk-free bonds in the first period and the level of public debt creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that public policies are inefficient and efficiency is increasing in the size of the majority requirement, with higher investment in public goods and lower debt associated with larger majority requirements. Also in line with the theory, we find that debt is lower when the probability of a negative shock to the economy in the second period is highe...

Published: Marco Battaglini, 2011. "The Political Economy of Public Debt," Annual Review of Economics, vol 3(1), pages 161-189.

September 2014Turnout Across Democracies
with Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli: w20451
World democracies widely differ in electoral rules, as well as in legislative, executive or legal institutions. Different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power. We explore how these mappings affect voters' participation to an election. We show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences for the competing parties. In particular, we uncover a novel contest effect: given the distribution of preferences, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of proportionality. Moreover, we generalize the competition effect, common to models of endogenous turnout...

Published: Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2016. "Turnout Across Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, , pages n/a-n/a. citation courtesy of

March 2012The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis
with Marco Battaglini, Thomas Palfrey: w17926
We present a dynamic model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose between private consumption and contributions to a durable public good g. We characterize the set of continuous Markov equilibria in economies with reversibility, where investments can be positive or negative; and in economies with irreversibility, where investments are non negative and g can only be reduced by depreciation. With reversibility, there is a continuum of equilibrium steady states: the highest equilibrium steady state of g is increasing in n, and the lowest is decreasing. With irreversibility, the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero: the highest steady state possible with reversibility. In both cases, the highest steady state conver...
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