Lily Fang

77300 Fontainebleau, France

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: INSEAD

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2018Corruption, Government Subsidies, and Innovation: Evidence from China
with Josh Lerner, Chaopeng Wu, Qi Zhang: w25098
Governments are important financiers of private sector innovation. While these public funds can ease capital constraints and information asymmetries, they can also introduce political distortions. We empirically explore these issues for China, where a quarter of firms’ R&D expenditures come from government subsidies. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the anticorruption campaign that began in 2012 and the departures of local government officials responsible for innovation programs strengthened the relationship between firms’ historical innovative efficiency and subsequent subsidy awards and depressed the influence of their corruption-related expenditures. We also examine the impact of these changes: subsidies became significantly positively associated with future inno...
September 2016Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Ownership, and Innovation: Evidence from China
with Josh Lerner, Chaopeng Wu: w22685
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection affects innovation in China in the years around the privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Innovation increases after SOE privatizations, and this increase is larger in cities with strong IPR protection. Our results support theoretical arguments that IPR protection strengthens firms’ incentives to innovate and that private sector firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than SOEs.

Published: Lily H. Fang & Josh Lerner & Chaopeng Wu, 2017. "Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Ownership, and Innovation: Evidence from China," The Review of Financial Studies, vol 30(7), pages 2446-2477.

August 2013The Disintermediation of Financial Markets: Direct Investing in Private Equity
with Victoria Ivashina, Josh Lerner: w19299
One of the important issues in corporate finance is the rationale for and role of financial intermediaries. In the private equity setting, institutional investors are increasingly eschewing intermediaries in favor of direct investments. To understand the trade-offs in this setting, we compile a proprietary dataset of direct investments from seven large institutional investors. We find that solo investments by institutions outperform co-investments and a wide range of benchmarks for traditional private equity partnership investments. The outperformance is driven by deals where informational problems are not too severe, such as more proximate transactions to the investor and later-stage deals, and by an ability to avoid the deleterious effects on returns often seen in periods with large infl...

Published: Journal of Financial Economics Volume 116, Issue 1, April 2015, Pages 160–178 Cover image The disintermediation of financial markets: Direct investing in private equity ☆ Lily Fanga, Victoria Ivashinab, c, , , Josh Lernerb, c

Combining Banking with Private Equity Investing
with Victoria Ivashina, Josh Lerner: w19300
Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex-post performance, we show that overall banks do not make superior equity investments to those of standalone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.

Published: Lily Fang & Victoria Ivashina & Josh Lerner, 2013. "Combining Banking with Private Equity Investing," Review of Financial Studies, vol 26(9), pages 2139-2173.

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