Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Economics
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801
Institutional Affiliation: University of Illinois
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2013||Bridging vs. Bonding Social Capital and the Management of Common Pool Resources|
with , : w19195
Social capital can facilitate community governance, but not all social capital is alike. We distinguish bonding social capital (within a village) from bridging social capital (between villages), and we compare their effects on the management of a common pool resource. We develop a theoretical model and show that bonding social capital can improve common pool resource management, while the effect of bridging social capital is mixed. We test these findings using primary data from Yunnan, China on social capital and firewood collection on communal lands. We find that bonding social capital decreases the consumption of the common pool resource, and bridging social capital erodes the effect of bonding. Bridging social capital also decreases the use of the common pool resource by villagers ...
|March 2013||Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy|
with , : w18898
We extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012 working paper) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage may be negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.
Published: Kathy Baylis & Don Fullerton & Daniel H. Karney, 2013. "Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 332-37, May. citation courtesy of
|April 2011||Negative Leakage|
with , : w17001
We build a simple analytical general equilibrium model and linearize it, to find a closed-from expression for the effect of a small change in carbon tax on leakage - the increase in emissions elsewhere. The model has two goods produced in two sectors or regions. Many identical consumers buy both goods using income from a fixed stock of capital that is mobile between sectors. An increase in one sector's carbon tax raises the price of its output, so consumption shifts to the other good, causing positive carbon leakage. However, the taxed sector substitutes away from carbon into capital. It thus absorbs capital, which shrinks the other sector, causing negative leakage. This latter effect could swamp the former, reducing carbon emissions in both sectors.
Published: Negative Leakage (with Kathy Baylis and Daniel Karney), Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (2014) citation courtesy of