M. Deniz Yavuz

Krannert Graduate School of Management
Purdue University
403 W. State Street
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056
Tel: 314 935 6339

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Purdue University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2019Business Groups and the Incorporation of Firm-specific Shocks into Stock Prices
with Mara Faccio, Randall Morck: w25908
In lower-income economies, stocks exhibit less idiosyncratic volatility and business groups are more prevalent. This study connects these two findings by showing that business group affiliated firms’ stock returns exhibit less idiosyncratic volatility than do the returns of otherwise similar unaffiliated firms. Global commodity price shocks are common shocks that contribute to firm-level idiosyncratic risk because they affect industries heterogeneously. Idiosyncratic components of commodity shocks are incorporated less into idiosyncratic returns of group affiliates than unaffiliated firms in the same industry and economy. Identification follows from difference-in-difference tests exploiting successful and matched-exogenously-failed control block transactions.
April 2013State-run Banks, Money Growth, and the Real Economy
with Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung: w19004
Within countries, state-run banks’ lending correlates with prior money growth; otherwise similar private-sector banks’ lending does not. Aggregate credit and investment growth correlate with prior money growth more where banking systems are more state-run. Size and liquidity differences between state-run and private-sector banks do not drive these results; further tests discount broad classes of alternative explanations. Tests exploiting heterogeneity in likely political pressure on state-run banks associated with privatizations and elections suggest a command-and-control pseudo-monetary policy channel: changes in money growth, perhaps reflecting political pressure on the central bank, change banks’ lending constraints; political pressure actually changes state-run banks’ lending.
December 2009Banking System Control, Capital Allocation, and Economy Performance
with Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung: w15575
We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. These findings are consistent with theories that elite-capture of a country's financial system can embed "crony capitalism".

Published: Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May. citation courtesy of

NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us