Washington University in St. Louis,
Olin Business School,
Campus Box 1133
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
Institutional Affiliation: Washington University in St. Louis
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2016||Intermediary Asset Pricing: New Evidence from Many Asset Classes|
with Zhiguo He, Bryan Kelly: w21920
We find that shocks to the equity capital ratio of financial intermediaries—Primary Dealer counterparties of the New York Federal Reserve—possess significant explanatory power for crosssectional variation in expected returns. This is true not only for commonly studied equity and government bond market portfolios, but also for other more sophisticated asset classes such as corporate and sovereign bonds, derivatives, commodities, and currencies. Our intermediary capital risk factor is strongly pro-cyclical, implying counter-cyclical intermediary leverage. The price of risk for intermediary capital shocks is consistently positive and of similar magnitude when estimated separately for individual asset classes, suggesting that financial intermediaries are marginal investors in many markets and ...
Published: He, Zhiguo & Kelly, Bryan & Manela, Asaf, 2017. "Intermediary asset pricing: New evidence from many asset classes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 1-35. citation courtesy of
|November 2012||Information Acquisition in Rumor Based Bank Runs|
with Zhiguo He: w18513
We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent-but-illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding-out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.
Published: Journal of Finance, Volume 71, Issue 3 June 2016 Pages 1113–1158 citation courtesy of