Market Design Working Group Meeting
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Bo Cowgill, Eric Zitzewitz
Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Koch Industries -
Hoyt Bleakley, Joseph P. Ferrie
Land Openings on the Georgia Frontier and the Coase Theorem in the Short- and Long-Run -
Hoyt Bleakley, Joseph P. Ferrie
Land Openings on the Georgia Frontier and the Coase Theorem in the Short- and Long-Run -
Yeon-Koo Che, Johannes Hörner
Optimal Design for Social Learning -
Federico Echenique, M. Bumin Yenmez
How to Control Controlled School Choice -
Nikhil Agarwal
An Empirical Model of the Medical Match -
Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, John Shim
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response -
Nikhil Agarwal
An Empirical Model of the Medical Match -
Federico Echenique, M. Bumin Yenmez
How to Control Controlled School Choice -
Federico Echenique, M. Bumin Yenmez
How to Control Controlled School Choice -
Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets -
Yeon-Koo Che, Johannes Horner
Optimal Design for Social Learning -
Paul Asquith, Thom Covert, Parag Pathak
The Effects of Mandatory Transparency in Financial Market Design: Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market -
Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications -
Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications -
Bo Cowgill, Eric Zitzewitz
Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Koch Industries -
Mark Satterthwaite, Steven Williams, Konstantinos Zachariadis
Optimality versus Practicality in Market Design: A Comparison of Two Double Auctions -
Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, John Shim
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response -
Mark Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E,. Zachariadis
Optimality versus Practicality in Market Design: A Comparison of Two Double Auctions -
Nicole Immorlica, Gregory Stoddard, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Social Status and the Design of Optimal Badges -
Lawrence Ausubel, Oleg V. Baranov
The Combinatorial Clock Auction, Revealed Preference and Iterative Pricing
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